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Alice thought she had never seen such a curious
croquet-ground in all her life; it was all ridges and
furrows; the balls were live hedgehogs, the mallets
live flamingos, and the soldiers had to double
themselves up and to stand on their hands and feet,
to make the arches.
The chief difficulty Alice found at first was
in managing her flamingo; she succeeded in getting
its body tucked away, comfortably enough, under her
arm, with its legs hanging down, but generally, just
as she had got its neck nicely straightened out, and
was going to give the hedgehog a blow with its head,
it would twist itself round and look in her face,
with such a puzzled expression that she could not
help bursting out laughing; and when she had got
its head down, and was going to begin again, it was
very provoking to find that the hedgehog had unrolled
itself, and was in the act of crawling away; besides
all this, there was generally a ridge or furrow in the
way wherever she wanted to send the hedgehog to, and,
as the doubled-up soldiers were always getting up and
walking off to other parts of the ground, Alice soon
came to the conclusion that it was a very difficult
game indeed.
Lewis Carroll, Alice In Wonderland
'All public policy rests on the assumptions, hypotheses, conventions,
and selective observations that constitute a conventional wisdom. Public policy
toward banking competition rests on the conventional wisdom of the Structure-
Conduct-Performance model of competition. This model has two earmarks. First,
*Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
**Miami University, Oxford, Ohio.2
it takes competition in the sense of behavior as conceptually distinct
from--indeed, to be explained by--competition in the sense of conditions.
Second, it regards competitive conditions as a matter of concentration in
the appropriate geographical market.
Now it is doubtful that competitive conditions can be defined
in a way that completely excludes behavior, for the actions of one bank
must to some extent affect the conditions of other banks. Nonetheless,
the conceptual divorce of competitive conditions from behavior is not
peculiar to S-C-P; indeed it seems essential to any model that can support
utilitarian public policies in a more-or-less free society. The govern-
ment of such a society cannot regularly order competitive behavior; it
can only foster competitive behavior by creating and preserving competitive
conditions. It therefore needs a model that not only distinguishes between
conditions and behavior but also describes the former as causing the latter.*
The S-C-P model characterizes competitive conditions in a particu-
lar way. It groups the country's banks into local markets and represents
the conditions facing each bank by the concentration in its market (or in
its markets, which might differ according to the service in question). It
thus assumes that banks compete--or more often, collude--with the banks in
their market but with no others, and compete the less vigorously the more
concentrated the market.
*If public policy were (classically) liberal instead of Qtilitarian,
it would aim at minimizing fraud and coercion instead of increasing social
utility. Then, as it would be concerned with punishing the proscribed
actions instead of fostering the prescribed ones, it would hot require a
model which defines competitive conditions to be strictly exogenous to actions.,The courts and regulators do not follow this approach slavishly.
But at some point in their deliberations on any proposed charter, acqui-
sition, merger, or innovation they will question its effects on local-
market concentration. Indeed, they could hardly do otherwise, for S-C-P
is the only model they know; it is what the students of banking competition
have given them.
In this paper we will mainly ignore those issues which have
already drawn critical discussion, viz., the appropriate delineation of
markets, the proper definition of their structure, and the correct measures
of performance.* These, for all their importance, are secondary matters
if the very concept of a local market is defective. We will argue that,
indeed, the S-C-P approach goes wrong at its very first step--the attempt
to organize banks into groups constituting local markets whose structure
determines bank behavior. After reviewing the evidence that shows how hard
such markets are to identify in practice, we trace this difficulty to
conceptual ambiguities in the very notion of a market in the required
sense. Then we show that if we could resolve these ambiguities and thus
find a satisfactory way to identify markets, we would no longer need to do
so. The very factors that would put banks into their proper markets would
already answer all the questions that S-C-P is intended to answer.
We are aware of the conventional view that ~-C-P, for all its
faults, has uncovered a statistically significant effect of concentration
on performance. But this is a pUZZling view. It is true that the majority
of published studies appear to show such an effect. A recent non-evaluative
*See Austin (1977) for a good survey.4
survey, for example, lists thirty-nine published studies of the relation
between concentration and profits or prices, thirty of which report at least
one relation that, though quantitatively small, appears to be statistically
significant at the ten percent level (Rhoades, 19Ti). In that survey, the
30/39 "success ratio" is interpreted as evidence of the basic validity and
fruitfulness of the S-C-P approach. But in the first place, most of the
surveyed studies present several tests of the concentration-performance
hypothesis; that is, they employ several different concentration and per-
formance variables and estimate several different forms of the relation
between them. For instance, Stolz (1916) regresses ten different price
variables on the Herfindahl index in three different ways (linear, cubic,
and hyperbolic), thus actually testing the hypothesis thirty times; of these,
only four show a statistically significant effect. This study--one of the
more careful ones--more truly represents four "succeaees" in ·thirty "trials"
than one success in one trial as tabulated by Rhoades. In the second place,
empirical research is more likely to be published (and if circulated in
working papers, noticed and remembered) if it reports a "success" than if
not. It thus seems premature to conclude that the percentage of "successes"
falls outside the ninety percent confidence interval implied by the null
nypothesis.
Even those who overlook this consideration tend to be uncoml"ortable
about the suantitative insignificance of the apparently statistically signifi-
cant effects of concentration. All, therefore, continue their efforts to
perfect the application of the approach by improving the data, clarifying the
notions of local markets and concentration, and refining the statistical
techniques. These efforts are indeed worthwhile, for the existing workleaves considerable room for improvement.*
Following that. we will return to our argument.
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But it might be as useful to
criticize the conceptual foundations of the approach. The meagre results
might not indicate imperfect applications so much as a defective foundation.
In order to get a hearing for this criticism, we judge it necessary to dispel
another widespread misconception.
The Supposed Support from the Industrial Studies
s-c-p originated in research on nonfinancial industries. Its
apparent success in explaining cross-section variations in the profits
of such industries is often regarded as ample justification for its
continued use in banking research despite its poor performance there.**
We must therefore digress for a moment to consider the results of S-C-P's
interindustry applications.
Though it is now a conventional wisdom--a, set of answers--
S-C-P began as an organizing framework for research, a source of questions:
What are the most important dimensions of market structure and how can
they be measured? What is the precise meaning of competitive conduct
and to what extent·is it observable? How are structure and conduct
related? These were never thought to be easy questions but they were
thought to be.fruitful. S-C-P was thought, therefore, to constitute a
useful research program. And indeed, the earliest effort in the program
*See the evaluative surveys by Bentson ( 1973) and Osborne (1977).
**Thus Rhoades speaks for many when he admits to "disbelief' and
frustration" at the repeated failures to find an appreciable effect of
structure on performance, since "so many studies of the industrial sector
have -f'ound a relatively large effect•.." (Rhoades. 1977, p. 16).6 •
disclosed a weak but statistically significant association between
concentration and profits in a sample of 42 industries for the period
1936-1940 (Bain, 1951). Probably because it was the first in the field,
this study became very influential and its finding came to be accepted
as truth. The several studies published soon afterward produced mixed
results leading to no firm conclusions and leaving Bain's influence
untouched. As late as 1971. Weiss could say that "practically all
observers are now convinced that there is something to the traditional
hypothesis. II (Weiss, 19'71, p- 371.)
Recent results, however, undermine the hypothesis in a fundamental
way. As the earlier studies supporting the hypothesis are reconsidered
with larger samples, longer time periods, and, if appropriate, sounder
statistical methods, two kinds of finding emerge. First, most of the
positive associations between concentration and profits vanish.* Second,
those that remain fail, on closer inspection, to be consistent with the
basic idea behind the hypothesis. This idea, it will be recalled, is
that firms in concentrated industries can more easily coordinate their
actions, by tacit or explicit collusion, to keep prices high and realize
greater profits. If so, concentration should permit higher profits among
firms of all sizes in the industry. Coordination, even if it were
limited to the larger firms, would nevertheless shield the small ones
as well. But Demsetz (1973) found that the remaining positive associations
between concentration and profits hold only among the large firms, not
the smaller ones. This pattern suggests that the above-average profits
earned by the leading firms in concentrated industries generally reflect
*See, for example, Brazen ( 1974, 1975).7
superior performance rather than collusion. Indeed, the superior performance
might well explain the large firms I growth to dominance and hence the con-
centration of their industries. If this is so, concentration, far from
leading to collusive behavior, actually emerges from competitive behavior.
Peltzman (191T), Brazen (1978), and others argue this view quite forcefully.
These findings are raising serious doubts about the conventional
wisdom. Phillips (1976), for instance, recently concluded that we know
very little about the relation, if any, between market structure and
profitability. It is too early to say when the findings will penetrate
the minds of legislators, regulators. and judges. But it is already too
late to justify S-C-P's application to banking by its interindustry
results. That application must stand or fallon its own merits.
Practical Problems With the Local-Market Concept
Since the later and more careful interindustry applications of
S-C-P had not yet appeared when serious research into banking competition
began in the early 1960's , S-C-P seemed to be a natural organizing frame-
work. In place of .eepar-atie industries one had separate local markets for
banking services but the analogy bet-ween them -was obvious, and the concepts
of structure and conduct seemed as appropriate to local banking markets as to
separate industries. Immediately, therefore. distinct geographic markets were
assumed to'exist for each banking service. Each such market being a self-
contained unit. the banks in it compete with each other but with no banks
outside it. Since the structure of this unit determines the conduct and
performance of the banks within it. the S-C-P theory requires considerable8
attention to structure. But no matter how much thought
we give to structure, it will be useless if we fail to identi~J the market
boundary.
s-c-p offers no help with the identification of local markets
and does not indicate the types, if any, of nonbank financial firms that
should be included in the market. These things have been handled in
about as many ways in banking as in the industrial sector. But despite
the generally poor results, the discussion tends to concern the particu~
larities rather than the approach itself.*
Many investigators have identified banking markets with ready-
made political unft.s such as counties, towns, or SMSA' s . The dangers
of this practice are obvious, and the courts and regulatory authorities
have tried to better it by using bank records to identify the geographic
area in which a particular bank. draws its customers. This approach
ignores the potential customers who could be drawn to the bank. by a more
attractive price~servicepackage. Moreover, it cannot determine how many
banks should be considered together in this manner. The resulting market
areas are highly sensitive to the way in which this determination is made.**
A better idea is to draw on economic and demographic data to delin-
eate "areas of convenience" within which most local residents work and shop.
Stolz (1976), for instance, identified a number of such areas as the
relevant markets for a wide range of bank products and services, such as
*Thus Austin's (1977) comprehensive survey of the issues in this
field, while quite critical of many particular ways in which the approach
has been carried out, never questions the validity of the approach itself.
**See Austin (1969) for a vivid demonstration of this sensitivity.9
demand and time deposits, car loans, farm operating loans, and farm
machinery loans.
This approach to banking markets can be tested by Analysis of
Variance. If each market indeed represents a distinct group of buyers and
sellers of a particular banking serVice, its prices should be fairly homo-
geneous. While prices might differ between markets owing to intermarket
differences in supply and demand, such differences do not exist within
markets by definition. Hence the dispersion of jc-tces-vttnrn markets should
be small relative to the dispersion across them. The better the assignment
of banks to markets, the higher the F-ratios will be.
Table I presents the results of these analyses for all of the con-
tinuous variables studied by Stolz. As the Table shows, for only one variable
is the F-ratio significantly large in all three states; for two variables it is
significantly large in two of the three states. Of the total of 42 ratios com-
puted for all three states, only nine are significantly large at the 5 percent
level. In our judgment, this proportion is too small to rationalize the
market assignment.
The convenience-areas are not, of course. without economic
significance. The banks within an area tend to exert stronger com-
petitive forces on each other than on banks outside the area. Com-
petitive forces "pi.Le up" in these areas and induce the banks within
them to compete more vigorously with each other than with banks outside
them. This is why some of the F-ratios are significantly large. To
check this reasoning, we performed a similar analysis of variance on
arbitrarily defined markets; that is. we randomly grouped the banks of
each state into 25 "maz-ke'ts" and computed the F-ratios as above. As
expected, none of the ratios were significantly large at the 5-percent
level.10
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One-year certificates of deposit •.••••••••••










........... Four-year certificates of depcsdt
Service charge on a standardized
personal checking account •••••••••••••••••••







Annual percentage rate charged on:
A 36-month-instalment new automobile loan ... L16 L40 L29
A standardized new f'arm machine loan
maturing in three years ••••••••••••••.•••• .86 L50 L23
A one-year farm operating loan secured
by crops or livestock ••••••••••••••••••••• L18 L82*
Annual charge for smallest-size
safety-deposit box •••••••••••••••••••••••••• .86 L08
Total hours bank is open for business:
During week ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• L17 L28 L08
0t1 Saturday . 2.75** 2.55** L8l*
Monday-Friday during the core period
(9:00 a..m, to 3:00 p.m.) .







1 .. Iowa, 109 banks and 25 markets; Minnesota, 113 banks and 25 markets;
Wisconsin, 111 banks and 25 markets.
* Significant at 5-percent level (the critical vaJ.ue is 1.66).
** Significant at l-percent level (the critical value is 2.05 in Iowa and
Wisconsin and 2.04 in Minnesota).11
We performed a similar analysis of a market partition determined
strictly by counties. Table II reports the results. Here considerably
more of the ratios are significantly large. This does not mean that
counties approximate the local markets postulated by the conventional
approach more closely than Stolz's convenience-areas do. Indeed, Stolz's
method would represent an appropriate procedure for obtaining such a
local-market partition if the conventional market concept were valid.
It is just that competitive forces tend to pile up in each type of
"maz-keb, II forcing some degree of homogeneity on the banks within it.
However, the forces extend past both kinds of "market" boundary, and
their effect on banks in other "markets" is a matter of more-or-less
and not same-or-none.
In any case, the variance within most of the markets is so large
relative to the variance between them that the markets cannot be dis-
tinguished on the basis of individual price and service variables. Actual
banking markets thus remain exceedingly difficult to identify.
Ambiguities in the Concept
Things which remain elusive despite diligent search often turn
out to be ill-defined or even nonexistent. That this might be so
of distinct local banking markets is suggested by three
considerations. First, the concept of a local market implicitly rests
on the assumption that locational convenience is of paramount importance
to the consumer. It is implausible to assume simultaneously
importance of this factor ends at the market. boundary. If locational
considerations prevent competition between markets, as S-C-P forces us
to assume, they must also affect competition within each market. While12
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Four-year certificates of deposit
A standardized new farm machine loan
maturing in three years ...•.•....••..•.••.
One-year certificates of deposit •.••••.••.••
A one-year farm operating loan secured
by crops or livestock .•••.•.•....•••.•••.•
Service charge on a standardized
personal checking account ..•...••....•...•..
Typical charge for a returned check
Annual percentage rate paid on:
Passbook saV'ings ..
Annual percentage rate charged on:
A 36-month-instalment new automobile loan .....
TotaJ. hours bank is open for business:
During week .





Monday-Friday during the core period
(9:00 a-m, to 3:00 p.m.) •..•...••..••.•••.







L Iowa, 109 banks and 45 markets; Minnesota, 113 banks and 43 markets;
Wisconsin, ill banks and 40 markets.
* Significant at 5-percent level (tihe critical value is L58).
** Significant at l-percent level (the critical value is 1.93 in Iowa and
1.9l in Minnesota and Wisconsin).13
this is partly a matter o£ structure (structural measures should depend
on time or distance as well as the number and size distribution of banks*) ,
it must m.a.k.e us wonder whether the conventional concept of a market is
appropriate.
Second, in areas where population centers are not separated by
large sparsely populated regions, the market boundaries must be somewhat
arbitrary. Customers who are located near the boundaries could bank
conveniently in either market. The competition between both markets'
banks for these borderline customers blurs the distinction between the
markets.
Third, it is difficult to believe that consumers care only
about Ioeational convenience. It is more reasonable to expect them to
care about a variety of banking characteristics, of which Iocational
convenience is only one: business hours. prices. lending policies, etc.
If consumers are always willing to trade some locational convenience for,
say, a better price, one cannot establish a definite boundary around the
area in which a group of people will select a. bank. That area depends,
in part. on the vigor of competition among the banks.
~ince competitive behavior partially determines the market
and hence the market's structure. it cannot be explained solely by
that structure. S-C-P. however. tmplies a one-way flow of causation
from market structure to competition and performance. This is its
fundamental conceptual defect.
*We are indebted to Alton Gilbert for this observation.14
Many people admit this defect in part; that is, they recognize
that conduct feeds back on market structure by affecting market shares.
But the defect is worse than this admission suggests. Conduct affects
the very market area. Strictly speaking, therefore, S-C-P cannot take its
first step--the delineation of market boundaries--without answering the
question to which this and the subsequent steps are supposed to lead.
This is a weighty objection, if indeed it does not entirely prove the case.
Uselessness of the Concept
To see just how distracting the local-market concept is, let
us waive the above objections and assume that the market problem is
solvable in principle. What does the problem laok like from an abstract
point of view?
We begin with a. set X of banks--all the banks in the country--
and wish to allocate them to subsets that correspond to local markets.
Abstractly, then, the problem is to define a family of subsets of X.
We might believe that there are several families of subsets,
corresponding to different banking services; the local market for farm
loans, for example ~ might differ from that for time deposits. We might
also believe that some of the subsets of a given family intersect, i.e.,
that a bank can belong to more than one market for a given service.
Alternatively, we might believe that the subsets do not intersect, i.e.,
that they partition X. Whatever we believe to be true of the family,
we must in any case assign banks to their appropriate subsets. If this
assignment were always obvious, we would have a characteristic function





In words, if bank x belongs to market M then fM(X) = 1; if not, then
fM(x) =O. We can say, therefore, that if the assignment of banks to
markets were never uncertain, each market would have a characteristic
function whose range is {O,l}.
But of course the assignment will in many cases be uncertain.
It will not always be obvious whether a particular bank does or does
not belong to market M. A local market is therefore a fuZZy set*:
in place of a characteristic function that takes values in the two-
element set {C,l}, it has a membership function taking values in the
closed interval [0.1]. If the membership function for market Mis
~. then ~(x) shows the degree of membership of bank. x in the market.
If x unquestionably belongs to M, then ~(x) = 1; if x unquestionably does
not belong to M, then ~(x) = 0; if membership is questionable, then ~(x)
is strictly between a and 1, being larger the more likely it is that x properly
belongs to M. Hence the assignment of banks to markets is equivalent to the
assignment of a membership number from [0,1] to each bank with respect to each
market. This is the market-delineation problem considered abstractly.**
*See Zadeh (1965).
**Ir we could solve this problem, we might use the solution in a
regression analysis (for example) to multiply the individual-bank data by
the value of the membership function. Thus, if ~(x) = 1, ~(x) = .5,
gR(x) = .2, and ~(x) = 0 for all other markets T, then instead of using
one observation vector for bank x in the regression, we would use three:
the given vector with the structure of market M, one-half that vector with
the structure of market N, and two-tenths of that vector with the structure
of market R.16
Without going into the particular factors that we would con-
sider in choosing membership numbers in the uncertain cases, we think
the general nature of those factors is clear. Suppose ~(x) = 1; then
in choosing a value for 9M(Y) we will have to consider the competitive
forces between banks x and y. If these forces are strong, we will put
~(y) equal to 1 or close to it; if they are weak, we will put ~(y)
equal to zero or near it. In other words, we can properly delineate
local markets only if we can evaluate the competitive forces between
banks. But if we can do this we can.deal with competitive conditions
directly; we will not have to proxy them by some index of local-market
structure. The more accurately we can delineate local markets, the
less we need them. This surely proves the case.
A Possible Alternative
Trying to solve a scienti~ic problem (or indeed any problem)
is like trying to traverse a maze. Wherever we might be in relation to
our goal, we can proceed along any of several paths, each
a potential blind alley. We must, therefore, constantly search for
signs that we have 'taken such a path. When the signs have accumulated
sui'ficiently we must abandon our path, however comfortably familiar it
might be, and set out on a new one. The abandonment of a blind alley
is progress. We therefore feel no compulsion to present, at this time,
a fully developed alternative to S-C-P. The following remarks, however,
might encourage others to join the search.
The essential idea behind the S-C-P approach is that competitive
conditions affect behavior. The approach expresses this idea in a
particular form. That this form is unproductive does not mean that the17
idea is wrong. What is wrong is the denial of tradeoffs between Ioeational
convenience and other aspects of bank services, and thus the denial of
all competitive forces between banks in different "mec-ket.s ;"
We might as well make a virtue of necessity and not only admit
but exploit the fact that, in some appropriate sense, all banks potentially
compete with each other. Instead of beginning with the extreme assumption
tbat the population of banks can be divided into subsets canstituting
local markets, it seems better to begin at the opposite extreme: all
banks constitute one market, in which, however, competitive forces are
very unequal.
It is no objection that people tend to bank near their homes or
businesses. Admittedly, distance and the associated transportation costs
give banks an advantage over their distant rivals in attracting local
customers, but they do not preclude competition between them. Any bank
that tries to exploit its advantage too intensively will lose customers
to distant rivals. The desire for profits will therefore lead the banks
to protect the part of their b~iness that is cheapest to protect--that
of their local customers. Hence consumers tend to deal with the closest
bank, not in spite of the competition with distant banks but because of
it. That consumers tend to bank locally is therefore, as consistent with
the assumption of one market as with the assumption of many.
The one-market assumption acknowledges the importance of loca-
tional convenience but avoids the necessity of classifying banks as
either convenient to a group of customers or not convenient. Rather,
it suggests that any bank offering a sufficiently attractive product
will become "convenfent" to any consumer. Naturally, it will rarely
pay distant banks to do this. Competition for more distant customers
is more expensive.18
Anything that increases the costs of competing for distant
customers will obstruct the competition between distant banks and~
therefore, permit competition to be less evenly distributed over the
banking system. The branching limitations imposed by many states
act precisely in this manner. As mentioned above, only a few performance
variables took significantly different values in the different convenience
areas defined by Stolz. - In Iowa, bevever-, .'which
permits some branching in either the same county as the home office or
a contiguous county, and where only two variables differed significantly
between convenience areas, eight differed significantly between counties.
In Wisconsin, which has only permitted limited branching since 1968,
four variables differed significantly between convenience areas and the
same four differed significantly between counties. In Minnesota, a unit
banking state, only three variables differed between convenience areas
and three also differed between counties. (See Table II.)
In Iowa, competition is distributed more evenly within and
less evenly between counties than it is in the other two states because
the branching regulations do not so appreciably raise the costs of com-
peting within counties as they do in Wisconsin and even more so in
Minnesota.
Again, Jacobs (1971) found that while rates on business loans decline
slightly with decreases in concentration, they decline significantly with
liberalizations of the branching laws. And when Horvitz (1968) calculated the
dispersion in rates paid on time deposits and certicficates of deposit in a
number of geographical regions, he found it to be smaller the less restrictive
the branching laws. Both patterns show that decreasing the costs of competing
increases the strength of competition and evens out its distribution.19
The one-market assumption directs our attention away from the
conventional framework's curious proxies for competitive conditions
(concentration ratios, Herfindahl indexes, and the like) to a more
direct consideration of competition itself, both in the sense of
behavior and in.the sense of conditions. Competitive behavior is the
attempt to attract and keep customers; competitive conditions determine how
strenuous the effort must be and how successful it is. The meaning of
competitive behavior thus suggests lines of inquiry into competitive
conditions.
The initial attraction of S-C-P was its apparent shortcut
past that inquiry. Instead of a research program concerned with the direct
measurement of competitive forces, it held out the apparently easier
targets of delineating local markets and measuring structure. Experience
proves that the apparent shortcut is a dead end. The one-market assumption
suggests questions that, though more difficult to answer, go directly to
the issues.20
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